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Local democratic governance is a mixture of rivalry and cooperation between majority and minority 
political forces. With the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, local governments had to rethink its action 
mode and carry out a swift digital transition of their modus operandi. This digital transition affected both 
the administrative and political dimensions of local government, in particular the nature of Executive-
Opposition relations. Although local democracy was not suspended, the context of exceptionality raised 
a series of institutional challenges. Using new survey data on the perceptions of local elected 
representatives (directly elected and ex-officio members of Municipal Assemblies) about the performance 
of their local democracy, we will seek to characterize Executive-Opposition relations in the Portuguese 
local government context. We will then run a probit regression model to assess three theory-driven 
factors influencing the nature of such institutional relationship in normal and exceptional contexts: the 
way minority rights are protected in practice in normal governance contexts; and the extent to which 
democratic performance and communication have been negatively affected by the pandemic context. 
The results show that Executive-Opposition relations are tendentiously conflictual. Our findings also 
show that the Executive’s capacity to explain to its constituents the scope and impact of the exceptional 
measures adopted to cope with the pandemic crisis and its formal duty to communicate these decisions 
to the Municipal Assembly may hinder Executive-Opposition cooperative relations. 
 
 












The literature on Government and Opposition relations tends to depict this relationship as essentially 
conflictual. Government does not need the Opposition’s moral support and the Opposition is expected 
to confront the Government’s options and decisions in an adversarial way (King 1976). This model of 
Government-Opposition relations tends to apply to majoritarian democracies, but it is less suited to 
describe consensus democracies (Lijphart 1984, 1999). Moreover, much of this theoretical debate focuses 
on democratic patterns at the national level with very few studies extending these conceptual categories 
to the subnational domain (Vatter and Stadelmann-Steffen 2013). 
 
Local government in Portugal is a combination of both models of democracy: on the one hand, it displays 
several majoritarian features, such as strong concentration of executive powers in the Mayor’s office, an 
electoral system with a method of allocating seats that favours large party formations and produces strong 
executives, weak parliamentary scrutiny of executive rule, and strong majority control over the policy-
making process; other the other hand, it contains several institutional elements that characterise 
consensus democracies, such as multiparty systems, proportional representation, inclusive cabinet 
coalitions, municipal executives with a dual composition of Government and Opposition councillors, 
and the legal protection of minority rights.  
 
With the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, local government had to rethink its action mode and carry 
out a swift digital transition of its modus operandi. This digital transition affected both the administrative 
and political dimensions of local government. Although local democracy was not suspended, the context 
of exceptionality raised a series of institutional challenges. Municipal Executives saw their discretionary 
powers legally strengthened to cope with the surge and scale of the coronavirus and to respond to the 
social and economic effects of the pandemic crisis, whereas the oversight capacity of Municipal 
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Assemblies depended largely on their adaptability to the new “telematic” context. Some Municipal 
Assemblies postponed their regular sessions, reduced, or even suspended the meetings of specialized 
committees, and even limited the intervention of the public. Others have resorted to videoconferencing 
and remote voting, reinforced their oversight over the executive, paid representatives for telework 
similarly to their previous presential work, provided information about the exceptional emergency 
measures on a regular basis and consulted the local opposition on matters related to the pandemic crisis 
and the measures taken by the executive. 
 
Overall, the increase in discretionary executive powers, in particular of the Mayors has not been matched 
by a reinforcement of the deliberative powers of Municipal Assemblies. The rapid spread of the virus 
added more pressure for fast and visible results. This meant that Municipal Executives had to follow the 
recommendations of health authorities and adopt a series of exceptional measures without proper 
consultation of and reporting to local deliberative bodies, causing a deterioration of Government-
Opposition institutional relations. 
 
In view of the above and considering the financial implications of the exceptional measures adopted, this 
paper intends to study the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the quality of local democracy (QoLD) 
and Executive-Opposition relations. We will do so in two steps. First, using new survey data, we make a 
descriptive analysis of the perceptions of local elected representatives (directly elected and ex-officio 
members of Municipal Assemblies) about the impact of the pandemic on various dimensions of QoLD 
widely discussed in the dedicated literature (Lijphart 1993, 1999; Vanhanen 1997; Schedler 1999, 2007; 
Diamond 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Andreev 2005; Buhlmann et al. 2007; Landman 2008, 2012; 
Pinto et al. 2013; De Sousa, Da Cruz and Fernandes 2021) and the nature of Executive-Opposition 
relations in their municipality. We will then run two regression models to test three theory-driven 
hypotheses influencing the nature of such institutional relationship in normal and exceptional contexts. 
In the first model, we try to understand what extent the perceived nature of Executive-Opposition 
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relations is influenced by the degree of observance of the rights of opposition by Municipal Executives. 
In the second model, we try to analyse to what extent such relationship has been affected by the pandemic 
context by looking at the capacity of the Executive to explain the scope of its policies and decisions to 
the general-public and its duty to communicate to the Municipal Assembly all exceptional measures 
adopted in response to the COVID-19. 
 
The article is organized into four parts. First, we discuss the importance of political opposition in 
democracy and the need to protect minority rights against majority abuses. Second, we present our 
research design, starting with a discussion of our case selection, followed by a description of our sample 
and participants and the dependent, independent and control variables used in our regression model. 
Third, we briefly present the descriptive statistics of our data. Fourth, we perform an ordered probit 
regression analysis to assess possible factors influencing the cooperative relationship between executive 
and deliberative bodies. Finally, we discuss the results and present some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The importance of political opposition and the protection of minority rights 
 
Political Opposition is a key component of any liberal-constitutional democracy. As Ian Shapiro simply 
put it: ‘Democracy is an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of government. It is about displacing 
entrenched elites, undermining the powerful, and empowering the powerless’ (1996: 51). The 
Opposition’s role in a democracy is not limited to contesting the Government’s actions and the right to 
appeal for votes against the incumbent during elections. The Opposition also plays a role in offering 
political alternatives, representing the interests and aspirations of their constituents, preparing legislative 
projects and actively engaging in deliberative processes, scrutinising budgetary and legislative proposals 
from the government, in exercising oversight over the executive and the public administration (Council 
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of Europe 2008), and even a “tribune function” (Lavau 1968), that is, by voicing the aspirations of groups 
that are systematically excluded from Government solutions, thus integrating them into the political 
system. In short, the Opposition contributes to enhance the stability and legitimacy of the democratic 
process. 
 
Most mainstream definitions of democracy (Schumpeter 1975[1942]; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990; 
Przeworski 1999) tend to regard electoral contestation and competition and Government and Opposition 
rivalry as a normal feature of politics. In a democracy, the confrontation of ideas, positions on the 
resolution of certain problems and visions for society, takes place through the coexistence of competing 
political projects, thus legitimizing the right to oppose politically and contest electorally the incumbent. 
In other words, the democratic game offers an alternative and peaceful method of solving social problems 
and conflicts, through pluralism and alternation. Other authors have placed less emphasis on competition 
as a key feature of a modern political democracy and have characterised this system of governance as a 
mixture of competition and cooperation between majority and minority political forces, between Government 
and Opposition (Schmitter and Karl 1991). 
 
The notion that in a democracy, power delegated through popular vote is not eternal (Linz 1998) and 
therefore today’s rulers may be tomorrow’s Opposition, invites adversaries to prudence (Przeworski 
1999: 14). In practice, however, Government-Opposition relations are not always cordial. In an earlier 
comparative study on Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Dahl (1966) reminded us that throughout 
the history of democracy, ‘stable institutions providing legal, orderly, peaceful modes of political 
opposition’ have been a rarity. In contexts of longevity in office of the same party formation, limited 
pluralism, poor checks-and-balances over executive rule, and a democratic culture marked by tensions, 
abuse of power and cleavages that cannot be easily soothed through dialogue and negotiation, the right 
to an organised political opposition can be at peril. The lack of rights establishing the necessary conditions 
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for the Opposition to organize and function within the political system, may push these political forces 
to adopt an anti-system rhetoric (Mair 2007: 7), thus threatening democratic stability and legitimacy. 
 
Adversarial politics between the Government and the Opposition with some degree of tension are 
expected in a pluralist democracy. What is neither normal, nor desirable, is when the focus of the political 
dispute moves away from ideological and programmatic differences to focus on the respect for minority 
rights, such as ‘procedural rights of information, representation and participation, speaking and voting 
rights, the right to table bills and motions, rights of supervision and scrutiny of the executive, and 
protection against mistreatment by the majority’ (Council of Europe 2010). While it is expected that the 
Opposition oversees the Government and exposes any abuses and omissions with prejudice to the public 
good; it is equally expected that the Government and the Opposition create conditions for dialogue, 
cooperation, and consensus-building on certain matters of interest to the community (Helms 2008). 
 
It is not imperative that democracies provide legal rights to the Opposition within the constitutional 
framework. For some authors, the democratic method implies that there should exist “a large measure 
of tolerance for difference of opinion” (Schumpeter 1975[1942]). Respect for the opposition is a matter 
of etiquette. For other authors, democracy cannot function and endure as a system of government if 
some basic rules of interaction are not in place. In this light, Sartori defines democracy as ‘a system of 
majority rule limited by minority rights’ (1987), moving the argument away from etiquette into edict 
norms. In Portugal, the Law 24/98, of May 26, Statute of the Right of Opposition sets a series of rights 
and guarantees to minority political actors, so that they can fulfil their role at the national, regional, and 
local levels of democracy. This aspect has been largely omitted in the literature. 
 
Democracy is an ensemble of interconnected institutional components that interact according to a set of 
rules to function as an organised, complex, and dynamic whole with a common purpose. The links 
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between the various components of this governance system are important to its effectiveness. The 
relationships between the various components can be of a cooperative or conflictual nature. 
 
In this sense, the first research question to be addressed in this paper is whether the nature of Executive-
Opposition relations in the Portuguese local context is primarily characterised as cooperative or 
conflictual (RQ1). The second research question is to what extent the nature of Executive-Opposition 
relations in local democracy is influenced by the way minority rights are observed in the daily institutional 
routine (RQ2).  
 
 
2.1. Government-Opposition relations in exceptional contexts 
 
The institutional performance of local democracies has been affected by the new pandemic context. On 
March 18, 2020, the Portuguese government announces the first state of emergency, and the subsequent 
adoption of a set of exceptional and temporary measures in response to the epidemiological situation 
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus and COVID-19 disease (Law 1-A/2020 of 19 March). Local 
government authorities, like many other public and private bodies, had to adjust their modus operandi 
to the new pandemic context. This exceptional period was extended until 2021 with successive renewals 
of the state of emergency and has become “a new normality”, in the sense that some changes to the 
institutional modus operandi will remain the rule for an indefinite period. 
 
The meetings of both Municipal Executives and Assemblies have been subject to adjustment. Some 
municipalities opted to postpone Municipal Assembly meetings until 30 June 2020 and suspended 
citizens’ attendance and intervention in those meetings altogether. Others began to use teleconferencing 




At the end of July 2020, the 7th amendment to Law 1-A/2020 of 19 March, created the necessary 
conditions for a swift digital transition in the modus operandi of local government authorities. Thus, 
executive meetings and deliberative sessions could now be held virtually or in hybrid format. The public 
nature of the meetings was safeguarded by mandatory recording and/or live streaming. The intervention 
of the public was also re-established in both formats. In addition, the new legal framework reinforced 
formal accountability, but without any penalties attached to those municipalities that did not comply with 
the new reporting procedures. Exceptional measures in response to Covid-19 under the Law 6/2020 of 
10 April, such as the granting of tax exemptions and/or financial support for citizens in vulnerable 
situations, and the contracting of short-term loans could be adopted by Municipal Executives without 
prior authorization by the Municipal Assembly. Although the Executive had to communicate these 
exceptional measures to the Municipal Assembly, in practice, the fulfilment of these legal obligations fell 
short of expectations. 
 
Drawing on this contextual experience, our third and fourth research questions investigate how the 
pandemic context has affected Executive-Opposition relations in local government from the viewpoint 
of democratic performance (RQ3) and communication practices (RQ4). 
 
 
3. Research design 
 
3.1. Case selection 
 
Local government has played a key role in the development of local communities and the consolidation 
of democracy in Portugal (Almeida 2008a, 2008b). Democratically elected and politically autonomous 
municipalities (autarquias) is an outcome of the 1974 Revolution. These 308 territorial units are endowed 
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with constitutional autonomy and legal personality. Their primary goal is to foster the legitimate interests 
of its populations. At the municipal level, local authorities are organised in two representative bodies: an 
executive body (Câmara Municipal, henceforth Municipal Executive) and a deliberative body (Assembleia 
Municipal, henceforth Municipal Assembly). Both bodies are directly elected by popular vote, and both 
have a president who represents them (a Mayor and an Alderman, respectively). These institutional 
arrangements have remained largely unchanged since 1976. 
 
What makes the Portuguese case particularly interesting in terms of Government and Opposition 
relations, is the fact that both bodies have Opposition members in their composition and minority rights 
are legally protected. Endowing both executive and deliberative bodies with a mixed composition, was a 
compromise that the founding fathers of the 1976 Constitution sought between voice/representativeness 
and government efficacy. With all its vices and virtues, this balance has secured high levels of 
governability and political stability for 45 of democratic local government (De Sousa et al. 2015). Portugal 
is also one of the few cases where Opposition rights are typified and enshrined in a dedicated law 
(Almeida and De Sousa 2019). 
 
 
3.2. Sample and Participants 
Our data stems from a survey carried out to the Presidents of Municipal Assemblies (PAMs), in the 
current context of the COVID-19 pandemic, through an online platform, from 15 February to 29 March 
2021, during the second general confinement. The survey sought to capture some of the effects that 
restrictive measures imposed during the first general confinement had on the functioning of municipal 
bodies at the municipal level. 
 
The survey was carried out under the scientific cooperation protocol signed between the National 
Association of Municipal Assemblies (ANAM – Associação Nacional de Assembleias Municipais) and the 
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Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-ULisboa), in partnership with the School of 
Public Management, Communication and Tourism of Instituto Politécnico de Bragança (EsACT-IPB). 
Invitations to participate in the survey were sent by the Secretary General of ANAM to the 308 Aldermen, 
who were asked to distribute the questionnaire, in digital (weblink) and paper format, among all directly 
elected local representatives (6461) and ex-officio local representatives (3092) of their respective 
Municipal Assemblies (N=9553), to ensure a higher response rate. Reminders were sent throughout the 
data collection period. 
 
 
3.3. Variables  
 
Our dependent variable is an 11-point Likert scale that reports the cooperative nature of the relationship 
between Executive and Opposition (Cooperation). More specifically, the higher (lower) the Cooperation 
scale, the more cooperative (conflictual) is the relationship between executive and deliberative bodies. 
 
The explanatory variables can be divided into three large groups of variables that correspond to the three 
hypotheses tested in this study. The first group only includes the variable Opposition Rights de facto 
(OpRdefacto), an 11-point Likert scale that measures the degree in which minority rights are perceived to 
be protected in practice (0: totally disagree; 10: totally agree). The second group of explanatory variables 
focus on the perceived COVID-19’s impact on the QoLD in eight dimensions: Participation, 
Representation, Oversight (Horizontal Accountability), Efficacy, Transparency, Responsibility (Vertical 
Accountability), Institutional Cooperation, and Subsidiarity. These eight variables are also 11-point Likert 
scales that range from zero (not affected) to 10 (severely affected). The third group includes three 
variables that measure satisfaction with the duty of communication from the Municipal Executive to the 
Municipal Assembly during the pandemic. The duty of communication, set under under the Law 6/2020 
of April 10, contemplates information about two exceptional measures to cope with the social and 
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economic effects of COVID-19 – the possibility of the Municipality to take short-term loans to fight 
COVID-19 without previous authorization from municipal assembly (Loans) and the granting tax 
exemptions without prior approval of a specific regulation by the Municipal Assembly (Tax Exemptions) 
– and information about the activity and financial situation of the municipality (Financial Situation). These 
variables are 11-point Likert scales that range from zero (unsatisfactory) to 10 (very satisfactory).  
 
The control variables can also be broken down into two large classes. The first class includes five variables 
that capture socio-demographic characteristics: gender (1: male, 0: otherwise); age; education (1: lower 
education; 2: secondary education; 3: higher education); and public job (1: yes; 0: otherwise). The second 
class includes four variables that capture political characteristics: left-right self-placement (0: left; 10: 
right); Alderman (1: yes; 0: otherwise); elected member of the Municipal Assembly (Municipal Deputies) 
(1: yes; 0: otherwise); and Opposition Rights de jure (OpRdejure), i.e. the degree in which minority rights are 
perceived to be protected by law (0: totally disagree; 10: totally agree). 
 
 
3.4. Ordered Probit Regression 
 
We use regression analysis to assess the factors impacting the cooperative relationship between executive 
and deliberative bodies (Cooperation). Since this relationship scale is defined as an ordinal variable, a 
linear regression model cannot be used because its assumptions are violated in the case of ordinal 
dependent variables. Thus, we use an ordered probit model, which accounts for the ceiling and floor 
effects and avoids the use of subjectively chosen scores assigned to the categories (Hanushek and Jackson 
1977). 
 
In this model, the ordinal dependent variable, denoted here by 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, is viewed as the discrete 
realization of an underlying latent continuous variable, 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗. The categories are envisaged as 
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contiguous intervals on the continuous scale. The unobservable 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗  would satisfy the 
following linear regression model: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!∗ = 𝑋! ∗ 𝛽# + 𝐶! ∗ 𝛽$ + 𝜀! 																																																																																																																					(1) 
 
where 𝑋" is an array of explanatory variables of individual i, 𝐶" is an array of socio-demographic 
and political control variables of individual i, 𝛽# and 𝛽$ are the vectors of parameters to be estimated, 
and 𝜀"  the error term. The observable categorical variable 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is assumed to arise from 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛"∗ as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑗𝑖𝑓𝛼%&' ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗ ≤ 𝛼% , 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽																																																																															(2) 
  
where 𝛼 are unknown cut-off points in the distribution of 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗, with 𝛼# = −𝐼𝑛𝑓 and 
𝛼$ = 𝐼𝑛𝑓. As stated above, the relationship scale is an ordinal variable which comprises eleven categories, 
that is, 𝐽 = 11. 
Since we are interested in analysing the cooperative nature in normal and exceptional contexts, 
we estimate two models. The first model – normal contexts – only includes OpRdefacto in the set of 
explanatory variables. The second model – exceptional contexts – also includes the other two groups of 
explanatory variables that focus on the pandemic. To select the most parsimonious model, we first 
included all possible explanatory variables and subsequently removed all variables that were not 










Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. Starting with our dependent variable, on 
average, the participants report a low cooperative relationship between executive and deliberative bodies 
(average = 3.97). In fact, using a t-statistic, we test if the relationship between executive and deliberative 
bodies is, on average, more conflictual than neutral (i.e. if the average is statistically inferior to 5). 
According to this test, our dependent variable’s average is statistically inferior to five (t-stat equals to -
4.9099), which means that the relationship between executive and deliberative bodies tends to be more 
conflictual. 
 
We now turn to our three groups of explanatory variables. First, participants reported a slightly positive 
perception that minority rights are protected in practice (average = 5.83). Second, regarding the COVID’s 
impact on the QoLD, while Participation stands out as the most affected dimension (average = 6.16), 
Representation and Oversight stand out as the least affected dimensions (averages = 2.71 and 3.32, 
respectively). Third, participants reported that the communication of granting exemptions from certain 
taxes without the approval of a specific regulation approved by the municipal assembly (average = 5.94) 
was less satisfactory than the other information (averages = 6.17 and 6.93). 
 
Turning to demographic characteristics of the participants, 78% of our sample are male and the average 
age is 55 years. Most of the participants have finished higher education (average = 2.76) and 38% is a 
public worker. 
 
Finally, regarding the political features of the participants, there is a slightly bias to the left (average = 
4.62). Regarding our sample, 76% are directly elected members of the Municipal Assembly (Municipal 
Deputies), whereas the remaining 24% are ex-officio members; 16% of the total of respondents are 
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Aldermen. Participants tend to report a positive perception that minority rights are protected by law 







Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Cooperation 210 03.97 03.04 00 10 
      
Independent Variables      
OpRdefacto 206 05.83 03.28 00 10 
      
COVID-19 Impact on QoLD      
Participation 193 06.16 03.49 00 10 
Representation 193 02.71 03.39 00 10 
Oversight 192 03.32 03.53 00 10 
Efficacy 189 04.21 03.33 00 10 
Transparency 190 04.08 03.64 00 10 
Responsibility 190 04.27 03.49 00 10 
Institutional Cooperation 192 03.94 03.76 00 10 
Subsidiarity 189 04.76 03.54 00 10 
      
Communication      
Loans 177 06.17 05.94 00 10 
Tax Exemptions 178 05.94 03.52 00 10 
Financial Situation 189 06.93 03.20 00 10 
      
Control Variables      
Socio-Demographic      
Gender (Male) 191 00.73 00.44 00 01 
Age 188 55.24 11.33 29 84 
Education 191 02.61 00.59 01 03 
Public Job 191 00.38 00.49 00 01 
Political      
Lef-Right Self-Placement 183 04.62 02.70 00 10 
Alderman 192 00.16 00.37 00 01 
Municipal Deputies 191 00.76 00.42 00 01 








Table 2 presents estimates for our two models, specified in Equation (1) in Subsection 3.4. The table 
displays the coefficients for both models, after applying our selection criteria described in Subsection 3.4 
to the broad choice of variables listed in Subsection 3.3. All standard errors are estimated robustly. 
 
 
5.1. Cooperation in Normal Contexts 
 
Column (1) of Table 2 characterizes the cooperative nature of the relationship between Executive and 
Opposition in normal contexts. For that reason, this column does not include the explanatory variables 
related to the impact of COVID-19. The first column suggests that the more local elected representatives 
perceive that minority rights are protected in practice, the more they feel that the relationship between 
Executive and Opposition is cooperative in nature. This result is in line with literature on democratic 
theories that puts emphasis on the need to secure a climate of mutual respect between government and 
opposition and observance of minority rights by the ruling majority as “conditions for the success of the 
democratic method”, as discussed in Part 2. 
 
 
5.2. Cooperation in Exceptional Contexts 
 
Column (2) of Table 2 characterizes the cooperative nature of the relationship between Executive and 
Opposition in exceptional context. To do so, this column adds the explanatory variables that relate to 





First, the positive relationship between the perception that minority rights are protected in practice and 
the cooperative nature of the relationship between Executive and Opposition persists. The persistence 
of this result shows the robustness of this association. Protecting minority rights in the daily institutional 
routine has a positive impact in the relationship between contending forces. 
 
Second, from all QoLD dimensions that might be affected by COVID-19, only Responsibility (Vertical 
Accountability) is suggested to have an impact on cooperative nature of the relationship between 
Executive and Opposition. More specifically, the more this dimension was affected by COVID-19, the 
less cooperative is the relationship between Executive and Opposition. 
 
Third, regarding how the Executive communicated the exceptional measures to the Municipal Assembly, 
only the granting of tax exemptions without the prior approval of a specific regulation was found to be 
statistically significant. According to Column (2), the less satisfactory was the communication of these 
tax exemptions, the less cooperative is the relationship between Executive and Opposition. 
 
These two last results show that in exceptional local governance contexts, the Executive’s capacity to 
explain to its constituents the scope and impact of the exceptional measures adopted (Vertical 
Accountability), and its formal duty to communicate these decisions, in particular those with financial 
implications, such as the granting of tax exemptions, to the Municipal Assembly (Horizontal 
Accountability), may hinder Executive-Opposition cooperative relations. Although local elected 
representatives believe the oversight powers of their Municipal Assemblies have not been negatively 
affected during the pandemic, in practice, their capacity to check potential abuses in the exercise of 




These results should be interpreted with some degree of caution. Conducting a survey to local elected 
representatives to assess the perceptions of the impact of the pandemic crisis on various QoLD 
dimensions and on Executive-Opposition relations, is only a first step to understand the adaptability of 
local democracies to adverse contexts. Other complementary studies are needed to obtain a more 
accurate picture of the transformations taking place in the performance of local democracy and its 
settings due to the pandemic. The Municipal Assemblies’ oversight might not only be penalized by poor 
reporting practices from the Executive, but also by the fact that health security and civil protection issues 
have become prevalent on the agenda local politics, impoverishing parliamentary scrutiny and deliberative 
processes in other policy domains of Executive competence. There has been a sort of “lockdown” of 
local politics by centring the debate around measures to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic or its social 
and economic effects and by appealing to a sense of forced unity, where ideological differences are set 
aside to respond to a common threat. This downplaying of different opinions and political dispute over 
these exceptional measures, may have helped to sharpen relations between the Executive and the 






Table 2. Ordered Probit regression estimations of Cooperation in normal and exceptional contextsa,b 
Variables  Cooperation in 
Normal Contexts 
(1) 
 Cooperation in 
Exceptional Contexts 
(2) 
OpRdefacto  -0.1616 ***  (0.0388)  -0.1427 ***  (0.0439) 
         
Responsibility      -0.0588 **  (0.0259) 
Tax Exemptions      -0.0651 **  (0.0297) 
         
Gender  -0.2272  (0.1892)  -0.2492  (0.1985) 
Age  -0.0064  (0.0077)  -0.0066  (0.0079) 
Education  -0.2729 *  (0.1499)  -0.2748 *  (0.1608) 
Public Job  -0.2381  (0.1715)  -0.2005  (0.1786) 
Political Orientation  -0.0496  (0.0321)  -0.0341  (0.0342) 
Aldermen  -0.2980  (0.2386)  -0.2765  (0.2459) 
Municipal Deputies  -0.0462  (0.2169)  -0.1637  (0.2278) 
OpRdejure  -0.0502  (0.0447)  -0.0747  (0.0468) 
         
Cut-off 1  -1.8077  (0.6995)  -2.0933  (0.7426) 
Cut-off 2  -1.4108  (0.6969)  -1.6260  (0.7391) 
Cut-off 3  -1.0365  (0.6953)  -1.2497  (0.7371) 
Cut-off 4  -0.6930  (0.6920)  -0.8792  (0.7335) 
Cut-off 5  -0.5049  (0.6896)  -0.6750  (0.7305) 
Cut-off 6  -0.1024  (0.6867)  -0.2484  (0.7266) 
Cut-off 7  -0.0912  (0.6864)  -0.0548  (0.7260) 
Cut-off 8  -0.4095  (0.6883)  -0.2934  (0.7277) 
Cut-off 9  -0.7478  (0.6925)  -0.6713  (0.7319) 
Cut-off 10  -1.0260  (0.6999)  -0.9379  (0.7388) 
         
Statistics         
Log Likelihood  -382.35    -344.42   
Pseudo R2  0.0464    0.0670   
Sample Size  173    159   
         
a Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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